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Elasticity and Buoyancy of the  
Tax System in Pakistan 
 
FAIZ BILQUEES* 
 
This paper examines the elasticity and buoyancy of the tax system for the period 
1974-75–2003-04.  The elasticity of the total tax revenue both with respect to the total 
GDP and the non-agricultural GDP base is less than unity.  Overall, sales tax takes the 
lead by way of improving revenues. The high coefficient of income tax inclusive of 
withholding tax, which is an indirect tax, is high. Excluding the withholding tax leads to a 
lower coefficient.  Sales tax with respect to imports and manufacturing also takes care of 
loss of revenue due to lowering of tariff and excise duties.  However, the sales tax 
coefficient with respect to the GDP base reflects the inclusion of service sector and 
utilities in the sales tax net, which has serious implications for the poor. The estimates of 
buoyancy suggest that tax changes did not lead to significant revenue augmentation.  The 
low buoyancy of income tax exclusive of the withholding taxes implies that imposition of 
massive withholding taxes coupled with an increase in the taxable income limits is 
working at cross purposes.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Tax responsiveness to changes in income is a crucial variable in projecting the 
tax revenues, and is a basic criterion for a good tax system.  This response is 
measured by two concepts: tax elasticity which measures the automatic response of 
revenue to income changes, net of discretionary changes; and tax buoyancy which 
measures the total response of tax revenue to changes in income.  In developing 
countries generally, the major taxes tend to have low elasticity and sometimes even 
the buoyancy is low. This is mainly due to the inherent weaknesses in economic 
structure where a large majority remains out of the tax net due to low average 
income levels, and unorganised nature of most economic activities, which erode the 
income tax base. However, an equally important factor has been the provision of 
massive tax incentives and exemptions to the manufacturing sector over extended 
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periods in most of these countries.  As a result, the levels of budget deficits and 
borrowings, and/or aid requirements become unsustainable over time.  Domestic 
resource mobilisation and reduction of budget deficits then become the major targets 
of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the short run, and in many cases even in 
the long run. 
In the case of Pakistan, while the initial stages of rapid economic growth 
were characterised by massive tax concessions, the nationalisation in the 1970s 
resulted in a massive shift to the informal sector, which became synonymous with 
the parallel or underground economy in a very short period.1 The continued 
reduction in formal employment, as a policy measure since the 1990s, has further 
expedited the expansion of the informal sector.  As compared to 20 percent in 
1974, after the nationalisation in 1972, and to 25 percent in 1990-91, it accounted 
for 54 percent of the GDP in 1998 [see Kemal (2003)]. As a result of the 
distortions created in the economy over time, Pakistan has had a chain of stand-by 
and structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes from 1973-74 until 2003. 
All the programmes had a special focus on tax reforms including improved tax 
governance, increasing the share of direct taxes, expanding the tax net, imposition 
of sales tax on a wider scale, and improving the tax elasticity and buoyancy.  
However, the implementation of the reforms particularly in the fiscal sector was 
visible only for the last programme of 2000-03. The expanded enforcement of the 
sales tax, rationalising the exercise of power by the tax officials, and some 
expansion in the tax net has been achieved.  However, the overall tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP still average less than 15 percent and the share of indirect taxes 
still exceeds 60 percent of total tax revenues. 
When the elasticity of major revenue sources remains low despite tax 
reforms either due to low base, or due to evasion or avoidance, the governments 
raise additional resources through discretionary measures.  Then, the growth of 
tax revenues comes through high buoyancy rather than through elasticity.  The 
objective of this paper is to measure the buoyancy and elasticity of the tax 
system in Pakistan over the period 1974-75 to 2002-03 by using the Divisia 
Index Approach, and analyse the factors responsible for the resulting size of 
elasticity coefficients.  The coefficient of elasticity depends on the level of tax 
rates, the progressivity of the rate structure, and the responsiveness of the tax 
base to changes in income.  This makes it possible to break up the value of 
elasticity into two components—the response of the tax base to a change in 
income, and the response of the tax yield to a change in the tax base of 
individual taxes through decomposition of elasticities [see Musgrave (1959)]. 
 
1Government policies to exempt the four units of weaving from taxes, and in general the policies 
that favoured micro enterprises over the large-scale enterprises led to a massive shift to the informal 
sector.  
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The value of base to income elasticity does not depend on the progressivity 
of tax rates; it simply relates the responsiveness of the tax base to a change in 
income.  The growth of the base depends on the way the structure of the economy 
changes with economic growth.  The tax-to-base elasticity depends on the tax 
rates; if the rate structure is progressive or if there is an improvement in tax 
administration, the tax-to-base elasticity will be raised by preventing evasion. The 
decomposition of elasticity in this manner permits us to identify the source of 
growth of tax revenues.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II very briefly reviews the trends in 
direct and indirect taxes, and highlights the policies adopted to improve the tax 
system.  Section III describes the data sources and the methodology used for the 
estimation of elasticity in this paper. Section IV analyses the results based on the 
Divisia Index Estimates of elasticity and buoyancy, and the decomposition of 
elasticities to describe the prevailing situation in the tax system and its implications 
for the economy of Pakistan. Finally, Section V concludes the paper with some 
policy recommendations. 
 
I.  TRENDS IN DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES2 
Pakistan’s tax system in its ability to raise adequate tax revenues has not been 
any better than many other developing countries.  It has not been able to generate 
more than 14 percent of tax revenues in relation to GDP. This lacklustre performance 
is largely attributed to three inherent weaknesses of Pakistan’s tax system, i.e., 
narrow and distorted tax base, over-reliance on indirect taxes, and weak tax 
administration.  For example, in the case of personal income tax, the fringe benefits 
of the employees remained exempt for a very long period of time.  Similarly, the 
exemptions from taxation of gross income have been quite generous, amounting to 
one hundred thousand rupees in the budget for 2003-04. The agriculture tax, mainly 
a provincial tax, has not been fully implemented due to the loopholes provided in the 
legislation for agriculture tax.  On the other hand, the industrial sector and the 
external sector have enjoyed massive concessions and tax holidays in the 1960s and 
1970s.  A large number of commodities were exempted from customs and excise 
duties without adequate monitoring to prevent the abuse of this concession.  The 
most important element in this “exemption exercise” has been the “ad hocism” of the 
policy measures.  All these special departures result in the loss of revenue and reduce 
the elasticity of tax revenues in relation to GDP. Furthermore, taxes have failed to 
increase as a share of GDP as the widespread tax avoidance/evasion—and the 
inability of the tax authorities to enforce tax laws—has undermined the confidence 
of the taxpayers in the efficacy of the tax system. 
 
2 All the tax revenues are the consolidated Federal and Provincial taxes. Local taxes, however, are 
not included. 
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The resulting inadequacy of revenues is reflected in Table 1, and total tax 
revenues average 13 percent of GDP over the period 1974-75 to 2002-03.3,4     
 
Table 1 
Composition of Consolidated Federal and Provincial Taxes in Pakistan 
Percentage  
of GDP 
Percent Share in 
Total Taxes 
Percent Share of Individual Taxes 
in Indirect Taxes 
Period 
Tax 
Revenue 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Direct Indirect Customs Sales Central Excise 
1974-75 8.03 1.12 6.91 13.2 86.8 50.0 11.3 38.7 
1976-77 11.94 1.78 10.16 17.4 82.6 47.5 10.5 42.0 
1978-79 12.94 1.71 11.23 14.6 85.4 50.7 9.7 34.6 
1980-81 14.12 2.52 11.60 20.7 79.3 51.7 10.5 37.8 
1983-84 13.18 2.19 10.99 17.4 82.6 51.5 11.1 37.4 
1986-87 14.48 1.94 12.54 16.4 83.6 58.9 9.9 31.2 
1987-88 13.84 1.84 12.40 13.0 87.0 47.0 10.8 19.1 
1990-91 12.70 2.03 12.00 18.0 82.0 54.9 17.6 27.5 
1993-94 13.22 2.80 10.67 25.1 74.9 49.7 23.5 26.9 
1995-96 14.35 3.72 10.41 29.1 70.9 46.8 26.3 26.9 
1997-98 13.26 3.91 10.64 35.0 65.0 39.1 28.3 32.6 
1999-00 12.90 3.67 9.33 32.5 67.5 26.4 49.9 23.7 
2000-01 12.90 3.75 9.14 31.8 68.2 24.3 57.4 18.3 
2001-02 13.22 4.06 9.14 35.3 64.7 18.3 63.7 18.0 
2002-03 13.80 2.89 9.91 32.2 67.8 18.9 65.9 15.2 
Source:  Pakistan Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
Direct taxes comprise incomes of the non-corporate and the corporate sector 
including the withholding taxes.5  The share of direct taxes remained very low until 
late 1980s, averaging 2 percent of the GDP, largely due to the extended tax holidays 
and exemptions in the 1960s and early 1970s, but picked up in the early 1990s.  
These increased by more than 3 percent of the GDP in the early 1990s and averaged 
3.5 percent of GDP between 1995 and 2003.  The share of indirect taxes averaged 
between 11-12 percent from late 1970s to mid-1990s, and registered a decline 
thereafter to around 9 percent of GDP. 
However, over time, the shift in the shares of direct and indirect taxes as a 
percent of total taxes has been quite significant.  The share of direct taxes increased 
from 13 percent in 1974-75 to 35 percent in 2001-02, but declined to 32.3 percent in 
2002-03, while that of the indirect taxes declined from 86.8 percent to 68 percent 
over the same period. 
 
3Even though there has been a re-basing of national accounts, a large number of enterprises may 
have been outside the GDP estimates.  And in any case, informal enterprises included in the GDP have not 
been paying taxes due to concessions as well as tax evasion. 
4The disaggregated financial statistics for present Pakistan, after the creation of Bangladesh, begin 
in 1974-75, as announced by the State Bank of Pakistan. 
5Other direct taxes including wealth tax, gift tax, and estate duty have been abolished, and the 
share of workers’ welfare fund is very small in the direct taxes. 
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It is important to note that the increase in the share of direct taxes in the 1990s 
has come from the massive increase in the withholding taxes.  In the late 1960s, 
withholding taxes were levied only on three sources of income: salaries, interest on 
securities, and payments to non-residents.  Until 1979, six kinds of payments were 
subject to withholding tax, which increased to 19 in 1994-95 and to 25 in 1999-00 
[CBR (March 2003)].  
Among the indirect taxes, significant changes have been observed over time.  
Customs duties which formed the major chunk of tax revenues until early 1980s, 
have been rationalised from a maximum rate of around 125 percent in 1987-88 to 25 
percent in 2002-03. Consequently, the share of customs duties in total indirect taxes 
has declined from 54 percent in 1990-91 to 19 percent in 2002-03.  It has been 
decided that they will now be used only for protection purposes. However, the 
decline in the customs duties and the excise duties has been picked up by the sharp 
increase in the sales tax revenue on imports and domestic production.   
Until late 1980s, sales tax on domestic production and imports was 
administered in such a way that it was no different from excise duties on domestic 
production and customs duties on imports.  As such, it served no useful propose but 
affected the distribution of tax revenues between the provinces and the federal 
government. The generalised sales tax was introduced very comprehensively in 
1989-90 and its rates have been revised quite frequently to increase tax compliance 
by the unregistered taxpayers and to generate additional tax revenues.  Between 
1990-91 and 1998-99 general sales tax revenues increased from 1.65 percent of GDP 
in 1990-91 to 2.77 percent in 1994-95, but these declined to 2.33 percent in 1998-99.  
However, as a result of the increase in the sales tax base, by extending the sales tax 
net in 1999-00, sales tax revenues increased to 3.7 percent of GDP in that particular 
year.  After averaging 4.6 percent in the following two years, sales tax revenues 
increased to 5.9 percent of GDP in 2002-03.  The slow growth in sales tax revenues 
was due to the revisions in tax rates for some commodities.  In the budget for 2003-
04, sales tax has been fixed at 12.5 percent for all entities.  
Frequent revisions in the tax rates have been adopted as a measure of fiscal 
policy to increase revenues. The personal income tax rates for salaried and non-
salaried persons have been unified; the minimum threshold for income tax was raised 
from Rs 40,000 in 1988-89 to Rs 60,000 in 1998-99, and five tax rates ranging from 
7.5 percent to 35 percent were introduced.  In the budget for 2002-03 and 2003-04, 
the minimum thresholds were raised to 80,000 and 100,000 rupees with the objective 
to enhance revenue collection by lowering the taxable income levels. Similarly, in 
the corporate sector, the banking company’s rates have been continuously slashed 
from 60 percent in 1992-93 to 50 percent in 2002-03. This decline at the rate of 3 
percent per annum will continue until the reform target of 35 percent is achieved 
within a five-year period.  
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In the late 1990s, a number of important tax reforms were announced, 
including the introduction of the book-keeping requirements into the Income tax 
Ordinance in February 2000, whereby 25 percent of the 1.2 to 1.5 million returns 
under the self-assessment schemes were to be subjected to random audit.  The 
announcement of 25 percent random audit under self-assessment was meant to 
encourage the public at large to file their returns without fear of undue harassment by 
the tax officials.  In the fiscal year 2002-03 only two percent of the returns were 
audited, and while the CBR said it was not a random audit, it did not specify any 
other basis for it.  This was essential to mitigate the general complaint against the tax 
authorities—that they unnecessarily harassed the taxpayers in the private sector in 
the name of detailed scrutiny.  In this regard, the powers of the tax inspectors were 
also severely curtailed; they are not allowed to open the returns filed.  However, the 
elimination of various tax exemptions, such as the withdrawal of tax-whitener 
schemes that guaranteed immunity from tax probes, making the interest income of 
national saving certificates taxable, bringing in-kind benefits of the employees within 
the ambit of income tax, and measure taken to make agricultural income tax fully 
operational have helped improve tax collection and the tax structure to some extent. 
These measures, it is expected, would lead to an increase in the number of taxpayers 
in the coming years, provided, the continuity of the policies is maintained.  
 
III.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The relevant data for this study for the period 1974-75 to 2002-03 are taken 
from the Central Board of Revenue Yearbook and the Pakistan Economic Survey. 
Contrary to the earlier studies [Chowdhury (1962); Khan (1973); Jeetun (1978); 
Gillani (1986); Kemal (1995)] the data used in this study were tested for stationarity 
with the objective to use co-integration technique rather than the simple OLS. The 
details of the requisite data transformation/adjustments and the outcomes are 
reported in Appendix I.  It will be seen from the appendix table that the series are 
non-stationary because the variables are integrated with different orders, so the data 
fail to meet the pre-requisites of the Co-integration technique for estimation. 
Therefore, we use the Vector Auto-regressive (VAR) technique to estimate elasticity 
and buoyancy for this study. 
To estimate the built-in elasticity of a tax system, the historical revenue data 
need to be adjusted for the effects on revenue from discretionary tax changes as 
applied from time to time.  The three common methods adopted to eliminate the 
effects of discretionary changes in taxes include the proportional adjustment method; 
the constant rate structure; and the dummy variable method.  However, a complete 
adjustment of historical revenue series is not possible in any of the methods..  The 
first method requires use of budget estimates of tax yields resulting from 
discretionary changes.  Not only are such data difficult to obtain, their reliability is 
questionable as the actual discretionary outcomes may differ significantly from the 
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changes proposed in the budget.  The data on discretionary revenues provided by the 
Central Board of Revenue are not only incomplete, these underscore two limitations 
of the data. Firstly, some of the measures proposed at the time of budget-making 
were never implemented, and therefore the financial effect could be different than 
reported in the data provided. Secondly, the calculation of financial effect of tax 
measures is based on the ‘static’ model. No dynamics have been captured, therefore 
ex-ante and ex-post differential can exist.  
The second method—the constant rate structure method—is not used very 
commonly because it places heavy demands on the availability of data.  It requires 
data on effective tax rates and on the changing composition of the bases.  Provided 
these data are available and both the tax and its base are defined narrowly enough to 
permit application of the reference year rates to later year tax bases, this method 
generates the most accurate revenue series.  However, such data are hard to come by 
particularly in the less developed countries.  
The dummy variable method does not require the use of disaggregated data on 
taxes, but it cannot be used properly when discretionary tax changes are quite 
frequent in the past. Furthermore, even if the discretionary changes are not very 
large, the specification of the estimation equations can be problematic unless there is 
information on the nature of the tax changes and the extent to which their effects are 
independent of one another. In the case of Pakistan, there have been changes in taxes 
almost every year, and the Central Board of Revenue has generally been over-
estimating tax revenues. 
Therefore, we choose to estimate elasticity by the Divisia Index (DI) 
Method—since it does not involve the traditional adjustment of the historical 
revenues to eliminate the effects of discretionary tax measures.  The measurement of 
elasticity by the DI approach involves three steps:  first, the effects of discretionary 
tax measures on revenues are estimated by an index that isolates the automatic 
growth of revenues from the total growth; second, the buoyancy of tax revenue is 
estimated with respect to GDP by a standard regression technique; and third, the 
estimated buoyancy is adjusted by a suitable transformation of the index of 
discretionary revenue, estimated in step one, to obtain the estimate of elasticity of the 
tax yield. 6   
The DI method uses only historic data and does not require the collection of 
specific information on revenue effects of discretionary tax changes, or on the 
frequency of past discretionary tax changes. However, two caveats may be noted: 
first, it may underestimate/over-estimate the revenue effects of discretionary tax 
change; and secondly, in case of large revenue effects, it may give unsatisfactory 
results.   
 
6As explained in Section III. (a) from Equation 8a to Equation 13. 
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III.(a)  Divisia Index Method 7 
The Divisia Index, derived from a weighted sum of growth rate of factor 
inputs, is an index of factor inputs, for the measurement of technical change.  The 
index of technical change is the ratio of an index of total productivity to an index of 
factor productivity, the latter measured by the Divisia index.  This measure implies 
that the percentage increase in total productivity caused by technical progress is 
equal to the percentage increase in output divided by the percentage increase in 
factor inputs. The appropriateness of this measure is based on its property of 
invariance, i.e., if there is no technical change, the growth in total productivity is 
entirely due to factor inputs.  A change in the Divisia index, therefore, gives a 
measure of the change in total productivity that shifts the production function due to 
all sorts of factors that are jointly termed as ‘technical change’. 
Intuitively, the effects of technical change are analogous to the effects of 
discretionary tax measures. Discretionary tax measures produce changes in tax yields 
over and above those caused by automatic growth in tax bases as technical changes 
induce changes in total productivity over and above that induced by factor inputs. 
This analogy can be explained more specifically as follows: assume that there exists 
a tax function that shows the tax yields resulting from k bases.  This is analogous to 
the production function that shows the aggregate output given by n factor outputs. 
For the given tax structure and the given configuration of the tax bases, tax yield will 
not change in the absence of any discretionary tax measures, just as, for the given 
level of factor inputs, there is no change in output in the absence of technical change. 
On the other hand, for a given set of tax bases, if we assume a discretionary tax 
measure is adopted that alters tax rates and/or exemption levels of one or more 
categories of taxes, the revenues produced are different from what they would be in 
the absence of such an action. This difference or change in the tax yield arises due to 
the induced shift (of either the intercept, the slope, or both)  in the aggregate tax 
function due to the discretionary tax action analogous to that caused by technical 
change in the production function, which produces a different output from that 
produced without technical change.   
A Divisia index of discretionary tax change, therefore, can be considered as 
analogous to the index of technical change.  This index should be equal to the 
percentage increase in total tax yield divided by the percentage increase in total tax 
yield owing to the automatic increase in the bases.  Similarly, like the index of 
technical change, a change in this index should reflect the overall revenue effects of 
discretionary tax measures.  
The applicability of this index of discretionary tax change is subject to two 
conditions: it must be derived from an aggregate tax function analogous to a 
production function; and it must posses the invariance property. 
 
7 This section is based on Choudhry (1979). 
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The necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure the invariance property of 
the Divisia index are as follows: there exists a well-defined continuously 
differentiable aggregate function, f (x1 (t),  …, xk(t)); the function f is linear 
homogenous (implying constant returns to scale). 
The existence of condition (a) is fundamental to the existence of a relationship 
between the tax yields and the tax bases, and the concepts of elasticity and buoyancy. 
In the absence of an underlying aggregate tax function, there is a fundamental 
indeterminancy about the tax yield and tax bases.  The “continuously differentiable” 
character of the aggregate tax function ensures the regularity of such a function, and 
prevents the erratic behaviour of the tax yield. Indeed the existence of condition (a) 
is central to the derivation of the Divisia index. 
The requirement of linear homogeneity is more restrictive because in a 
progressive rate structure, such as that in case of income tax, it is clear that an 
increase in per capita incomes will produce more than proportional increase in 
revenues. However, the elimination of this restriction by Hulten (1973)8 made 
possible the application of the DI to aggregate functions with non-constant returns 
without violating the invariance property.  It is important, however, to point out here 
that  the assumption of a homogeneous aggregate tax function is justified in case of 
LDCs where tax ratios (tax/GDP) have increased relatively faster than in the 
developed countries but the average increase has been rather small.9  These trends in 
aggregate revenues can be written as a homogeneous function of GDP (x)  
µ= axT  … … … … … … … (1) 
When x rises over time, the tax ratio remains constant or rises as the value of µ 
(buoyancy) equals or exceeds unity.   
This homogeneous tax function has been extensively used in empirical studies 
for estimating the buoyancy or the elasticity of tax revenues.  
 
Derivation of the DI of Discretionary Tax Revenues 
Using the continuously differentiable aggregate tax function at each point in 
time: 
];)(...,)([)( ttxtxftT ki=  … … … … … (2) 
Where T is the aggregate tax yield; x denotes the proxy tax base for k categories of 
taxes; and t, the time variable is the proxy for discretionary tax measures.  The 
effects of discretionary tax measures in Equation (3) are obtained by taking the 
logarithm of the tax function, differentiating with respect to time and re-arranging as: 
 
8As reported in Choudhry (1979). 
9While Choudhry (1979) quotes Chelliah, et al. (1975), reporting that the average tax ratios of 
developing countries has increased by 13.6 percent for 1961-68, to 15.1 percent for 1969-70, it will be 
seen from Table 1 that for Pakistan this ratio averages only 14 percent for 1990-91 to 2002-03. 
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To obtain the index of discretionary tax revenue over the time interval [0,n] 
Equation (4) is integrated as: 
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Normalising by setting D(0=1), D(n) represents the index of revenue growth  only 
due to discretionary tax measures over time. 
Star and Hall (1976) simplified the right-hand side of Equation (5) by 
replacing the fluctuating βi(t) by a constant )(~ tiβ  which is some form of weighted 
average of the βi(t). 
This transformation yields Equation (6) of the form: 
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integrating the left-hand side of Equation (6) leads to  
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In Equation 7 the growth rate of tax revenues is divided by the index of automatic 
growth of tax revenues as measured by the denominator. 
If the left-hand side of Equation (7) is put into the right-hand side of Equation 
(5), we get 
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In Equation (8) the growth of discretionary tax revenues is the difference between 
the growth rates of total tax revenues and automatic tax revenues, which is a sum of 
the growth rates of the (proxy) bases where the weight )(~ tiβ  is obtained from 
Equation (7). 
In log form Equation (8) can be written as: 
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The index D(n) does not require any adjustment of historical revenue data, and it is 
the exact index of discretionary tax revenues as  derived from Equation 2, subject to 
the limitations of over- and under-estimation as pointed out earlier. 
Having derived the index of discretionary change, the estimation of the 
buoyancy of tax revenues is simple: for the simple homogenous aggregate tax 
function when the homogeneity is assumed to be r > 0, it can be shown that if the 
growth rates of all the bases are equal to that of GDP, then the tax function takes the 
form 
µ== )()()()( * taxtDtaxtT r  … … … … … (9)   
Where x denotes GDP, D* denotes an index of revenue growth due to the 
discretionary changes in the time interval [0, n], and µ denotes the buoyancy of tax 
yield.  The index D* is a special case of index D, and, for the time interval [0, n] it 
has the same form 
*~
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Where  
ρρ
ρβ=β ∫ ,)()(1~ 0* dtttn
n being the growth rate of GDP.  
Also from Equation (9) it follows the index D* for the time interval [0, n] can 
be written as: 
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Index D* is invariant.  If there is no discretionary tax change in the time interval, the 
elasticity of the tax system r must equal the buoyancy µ of the tax yield, but this 
implies that D*(n) = 1. 
Under the DI method, the estimation of elasticity from the historical data 
involves two steps: 
We first estimate the buoyancy µ from the unadjusted historical revenue data 
for the time interval [0, n], by estimating the tax function  T = axµ.  Secondly, since 
index D* is derived from the underlying tax function f as index D, the latter can be 
substituted in Equation (11), which yields 
r
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nxnD
ˆ
)0(
)()(
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⎥⎦
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⎡=  … … … … … … (12) 
Taking logs, Equation 12 gives  
[ ])0(/)(log
)(logˆ
xnx
nDr −µ=  … … … … … (13) 
Equation 13 provides the estimate of the elasticity r from the unadjusted historical 
revenue data, subject to the limitations of over- or under-estimation.    
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
With reference to Equation 2, the main categories of federal taxes and their 
relevant bases, besides the GDP, are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Consolidated Federal and Provincial Taxes and  
Corresponding Relevant Bases 
          Categories of Taxes Relevant Bases 
1. Direct tax/total income tax of the 
corporate and  non-corporate sector 
excluding the tax on agricultural 
income but including the 
withholding tax 
2. Customs Duties 
3. Excise Duties 
4. Sales Tax 
 
 
Non-agricultural GDP 
 
 
Imports 
Manufacturing sector output 
Domestic output, services, and imports 
 
Until the mid-1970s, the income tax and corporate tax were reported 
separately, but it was decided to merge the income tax statistics of the corporate and 
the non-corporate sector.  Since the agriculture tax is a purely provincial subject, it is 
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not included; but the withholding tax of the corporate sector is included in the 
income tax.  The relevant base for customs duty is the value of imports.  Prior to the 
policy of tariff reduction, customs duty was the major source of tax revenues, but 
now it is only used for protection purposes.  Similarly, prior to mid-1990s, excise 
duty was levied on the manufacturing sector, retail businesses, financial services, and 
other services.  However, with the enlargement of the sales tax net, and its effective 
implementation, excise duties are now levied mainly on domestic manufacturing.  
Sales tax is levied on domestic output including services and imports.  
Following the DI approach, the buoyancy is estimated by estimating the tax 
function T = ax µ , with respect to total GDP, and the elasticity estimates are obtained 
by adjusting buoyancy as given by Equation 13. Since the overall effect of 
discretionary change is shown to increase revenues, the elasticity of tax revenues is 
expected to be smaller than the buoyancy. However, in Table 3  we see that the 
coefficients of elasticity slightly exceed those of the buoyancy for both the customs 
duties and the sales tax in the long run.  In case of customs duties, however, the 
elasticity coefficient is considerably lower than unity. The high elasticity of sales tax 
with respect to the total GDP base may clearly be attributed to the extension of sales 
tax to electricity, gas, and petroleum products. These items constitute the basic input 
to all the production and distribution network in the economy.  The inelastic demand 
for these inputs makes the revenues from the sales tax more elastic with reference to 
GDP base.   
 
Table  3 
Elasticity and Buoyancy of Consolidated Federal and  
Provincial Taxes (with GDP Base) 
  Total 
Tax 
Income 
Tax 
Customs 
Duty 
Excise 
Duty 
Sales 
Tax 
Short run 1974–2003      
     Buoyancy 0.44 0.40 –0.06 0.48 0.42 
     Elasticity 0.33 0.31 –0.20 0.06 0.38 
Long run 1974–2003      
     Buoyancy 0.92 1.23 –1.19 0.48 1.41 
     Elasticity 0.88 1.21 0.43 0.44 1.50 
 
The short-run elasticities are included with a view to examining if the 
measures announced have full impact during the year or not.  
Elasticity estimates for all tax categories with respect to their relevant bases 
have also been estimated both for the short run and the long run.  However, only the 
results for the long-run estimates with reference to relevant bases are discussed here 
since they are more relevant from the policy point of view. 
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It will be seen from Table 4 that the elasticity of total tax remains below unity 
mainly due to a sharp decline in the elasticity coefficient of customs duties. The income 
tax accounts for only 35 percent of the total tax revenue, and income tax elasticity though 
highly significant is only 1.15 despite the inclusion of withholding taxes.10 
 
Table 4 
Elasticity Estimates of Federal and Provincial Taxes 
Using only Relevant Bases 
   Tax Relevant Base 
Elasticity 
Coefficients 
Weight of 
Tax in 2003 R–2 T-test 
Total Tax  0.94 (0.42)d 100.00 1.00 2.37 
Direct Tax/Income Tax Non-agriculture GDP 1.15 (0.16 35.3a 0.99 6.91 
Sales Tax on Domestic Output Non-agriculture GDP 1.81 (0.32)    
Sales Tax on Domestic Output GDP 1.85 (0.58) 63.7bc 0.99 7.28 
Sales Tax on Imports Imports 1.23 (0.49)  0.99 3.77 
Customs Duty Imports –1.25 (–0.23) 18.3b 0.99 12.31 
Excise Duty Manufacturing Output 0.71 (0.25) 18.0b 0.99 3.08 
(a)  Percent of total taxes;  (b) percent of indirect tax;  (c) refers to total sales tax;  (d) short-run elasticities 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
Withholding taxes accounted for more than 70 percent of net income tax 
collections, and for almost the entire revenue augmentation in the 1990s. Since most of 
the withholding taxes constitute a final discharge of tax liability if these were excluded 
then the direct taxes would be around 1-2 percent of the GDP in the 1990s [IMF (2001)]. 
The withholding taxes in Pakistan are essentially indirect taxes because firms/individuals 
paying a fixed 5 percent withholding tax are not required to file an income tax return.  In 
this case, a person pays a 5 percent withholding tax to import a commodity, but when he 
earns 10 percent or more profit on selling it onwards, that profit is not taxable because he 
does not file an income tax return.  Therefore, accounting them as direct taxes has serious 
implications.  While the government loses on revenue, the tax authorities are content that 
a fixed amount of tax is ensured without getting into the hassle of tax returns, which 
involves scrutiny, disputes, claims, refunds, etc.   This has prevented the modernisation of 
the tax administration to improve the income tax collection on more rational grounds for 
a long time. Currently, the CBR is reported to have introduced the filing of tax returns by 
the WHT payers on a limited scale. 
Sales tax accounts for 64 percent of the revenues from indirect taxes. 
Disaggregating by relevant bases we see that the elasticity of sales tax on domestic 
output with respect to non-agricultural GDP is the highest—1.81.11 However, as 
 
10When WHT is excluded, the coefficient of the income tax is reduced and its significance level 
also drops.  However, it is not reported here due to gaps in information on WHT in the earlier period.  
11This may seem at odds with the coefficient of sales tax with GDP base in Table 3.  However, it 
reflects the fact that a large proportion of the poor population who live in the rural areas do not have 
access to gas and electricity, and hence do not pay sales tax.  However, by its weight in the total count it 
pulls down the estimates, and when it is excluded the coefficient rises.  
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pointed out earlier, this increase has been made possible by extending the sales tax 
net to the petroleum products, gas, and electricity since 1999-2000.  These 
commodities are basic inputs to all the production and distribution network, thus the 
production and distribution of the basic food items has been affected by the taxation 
of these items, affecting the consumption levels of the already poor.  The increased 
expenditure on fuel and lighting-despite lowering its consumption, has led to lower 
consumption of other essential food items.  However, the full increase in the prices 
of these three items is not fully reflected in the consumer price index [Kemal 
(unpublished)].  The report of the State Bank12 has revised its end-of-the-year target 
of inflation upwards due to the rapid increases in the prices of the petroleum 
products on fortnightly basis for the past two months. The report relates the decline 
in sales tax revenues from kerosene oil to the decline in the purchase of kerosene oil 
by the poor, who have turned to cutting the already thin woodlands for fuel.  Recent 
estimates by different groups show that the government gets Rs 13 per litre of 
petroleum products in the form of customs and excise duties, a fixed sum is 
earmarked as revenue from the petroleum development levy, in addition to a 15 
percent sales tax.  The profits of the oil marketing companies are over and above 
these and other costs deductions. 
The coefficient of elasticity of sales tax for imports is 1.23. However the 
elasticity of customs duties on imports is exceptionally low at –1.25 in the presence 
of sales tax, which picks up the loss in revenue due to the reduction in tariffs. 
Similarly, although excise duties account for 18 percent of the indirect tax revenues 
and are levied on inelastic items including beverages, cigarettes, and natural gas, the 
elasticity of excise duty is less than unity due to the imposition of the sales tax.   
 
Decomposition of Elasticities 
 The elasticity of a given tax 
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12State Bank of Pakistan (2005).  
13This identity is strictly true when the function is perfectly estimated, i.e., when  2R  level is 
1.00.  It does not hold strictly in this case because there are differences between the overall elasticities of 
tax and the product of the decomposed elements, as follows: for total taxes (0.961 vs. 0.948), income tax 
(1.208 vs. 1.165), customs duties (0.432  vs. 1.232), excise duties (0.435 vs. 0.690), and sales tax (1.498 
vs. 1.838). 
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Where  
 T = tax revenue, 
 Y = GDP, and 
 Bk = base related to individual categories of taxes. 
The decomposing of tax elasticities is helpful in identifying the dynamic and 
the lagging components of the tax system.  Furthermore, the governments can 
influence the tax to base component to improve the elasticity of a particular tax.  The 
results of decomposition of four major taxes have been related to the relevant bases, 
which are then related to GDP as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Decomposition of Tax Elasticities 
Taxes Tax to GDP Base to GDP Tax to Base 
Total 0.961 1.017 0.934 
Direct 1.208 1.017 1.146 
Customs 0.432 0.986 –1.250 
Excise 0.435 0.984 0.706 
Sales 1.498 1.017 1.808 
 
In case of income tax, the base-to-GDP elasticity is low whereas the tax-to-
base elasticity is higher.  The vast scale of tax exemptions and evasion both in the 
formal and the informal sectors, and the unchecked growth of the informal sector, 
which is synonymous with the underground economy in Pakistan, are responsible for 
the erosion of the tax base.  The current policy of loans through the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Development Agency (SMEDA) bank is a step in the right 
direction for the informal sector in the small scale manufacturing sector, where firms 
are constrained to expand due to credit constraints.  However, the policy of micro 
credit in general, mainly through the non-government organisations as well as 
through some special banks to promote self-employment is a step towards the 
expansion of the informal sector.  The amounts of loans in this case are so small that 
it allows individuals to engage only in subsistence self-employment in the informal 
sector.  The higher tax-to-base elasticity for income tax reflects the inclusion of the 
withholding taxes in income tax, which, as pointed out earlier, blunts the incentive to 
broaden the base of income tax. 
The low coefficient of the base-to-GDP elasticity for customs duties is due to 
the exemption from customs duties for a wide range of raw materials and machinery.  
The low tax-to-base elasticity captures the effect of the reduction in tariffs over time.  
The high tax-to-base elasticity of the sales tax, resulting in a high overall elasticity 
coefficient (1.81), implies that the tax net has been widened significantly.  This 
Elasticity and Buoyancy of the Tax System 
 
 
89
includes the imposition of the sales tax on electricity, gas, and petroleum products, 
with consequent adverse effects on the already poor. Elasticities of the three 
components for excise duties are less than unity.  Low tax collection relative to the 
base is attributable mainly to replacement of excise duty by the sales tax.  However, 
at the same time, cheaper smuggled as well as imported goods have flooded the 
domestic markets, resulting in loss of revenues to the government on account of 
excise duty and sales tax.  
Overall, the low base-to-income elasticities, as well as the relatively lower 
tax-to-base elasticities, explain the low elasticities of the various taxes.  They reflect 
the failure of the successive governments to improve the tax administration. Efforts 
to improve the tax imposition and implementation have been beset with loopholes to 
allow evasion in one form or another.  Furthermore, “ad hocisim” in policy measures 
to enhance revenues has resulted in distortions and narrow bases with consequent 
decline in revenues.   
The findings of this study can be compared with earlier studies to show that 
the low elasticities have been inherent in the Pakistani tax system for a long time.  Of 
the six studies reviewed here, four have similar findings, which are attributed to low 
tax-to-base elasticities.  The study by Khan (1974) for the period 1960-61 to 1971-72 
estimates the elasticity and buoyancy of the tax system using the Dummy Variable 
method.   In this study, elasticites exceed buoyancy for total tax revenues, excise 
duties, and income tax.  However, elasticities for sales tax, customs duties, and 
income tax from manufacturing are less than unity but still exceed the buoyancy 
coefficients. It appears that this study is beset with all the problems associated with 
this method as described in Section III. The coefficient of customs duties is puzzling 
because it was the main source of revenues until late 1980s.  The study by Jeetun 
(1978) uses Khan’s data-set extended by four years to estimate the buoyancy and 
elasticity by the Proportional Adjustment Method, and his findings differ 
significantly from those of Khan.  He reports less than unity elasticity for all taxes 
with different bases except for customs duties with GDP base.  Furthermore, they are 
less than the buoyancy estimates.  He attributes these results to low tax-to-base 
elasticities particularly for income tax, which is supposed to be progressive. In the 
case of Pakistan, Jeetun rightly argues that progressivity is lost to various 
concessions and exemptions, besides a weak tax administration and widespread 
evasion.  These findings are confirmed by the present study despite the use of a 
different methodology and the different time-period covered.  This confirms that the 
distortions prevailing in the tax system in the 1960s still persist. 
Gillani (1986) uses both the proportional adjustment and the Divisia Index 
methods to estimate the elasticity and buoyancy of taxes for the period 1972 to 1982.  
The results of this study are closer to those of Khan’s study, it shows high elasticity 
coefficients for all taxes except for export taxes on account of the two methodologies 
used.  However, the gaps in the methodologies make a systematic analysis difficult.  
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The estimates of elasticity and buoyancy by Kemal (1995) over the period 
1971 to 1992, based on the Proportional Adjustment Method, coincide with those of 
Jeetun and the present study.  The buoyancy coefficients exceed the elasticity 
coefficients by a wide margins. As compared to this study, the coefficients of 
elasticity are relatively lower because they do not capture the impact of the reforms 
initiated in the early 1990s.  
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The estimates of buoyancy and elasticity based on the Divisia Index approach 
show that overall the use of discretionary measures has been relied upon 
significantly as a source of revenue augmentation  in Pakistan. The low elasticites of 
the tax system reported by earlier studies using a different methodology confirm the 
existence of continued exemptions, allowances, and loopholes for evasion.  All these 
factors contribute to distortions in the tax system, preventing the tax base to broaden 
as the economy expands. The reforms in the tax structure since late 1990s—in terms 
of a relatively cleaner administration facilitating the tax-payers—and the broadening 
of the sales tax base are visible.  However, the efforts to increase the share of direct 
taxes are at best extremely limited.  Inclusion of the withholding tax as a part of 
direct tax reflects an artificial increase in the share of income tax, which has adverse 
implications for a genuine increase in income tax revenues, as for expanding the tax 
net. 
Broadening of the sales tax base in a relatively short period is a positive 
development. However, at the same time, the imposition of sales taxes on petroleum 
products and utilities ignores its adverse impact on the already poor segments of the 
population.  
The reduction in the tariff rates over time affects the coefficient of elasticity 
for imports significantly. However, the decline in the customs duty coefficients is 
picked up by the sales tax revenue from imports. The decline in revenues from the 
excise duties is also predictable considering the extension of sales tax to a large 
number of sectors/commodities.  This decline is captured by the coefficient of sales 
tax on domestic output.  
Overall, it appears that taxes are being levied without due consideration to 
equity issues.  For example, the capital gains on equity remain exempted from tax on 
the pretext of developing stock markets; therefore the billions being earned from the 
stock market bubble remain untaxed, while sales tax on petroleum products and 
utility prices has overburdened the common man. This has directly affected the 
common man with limited resources. 
The easy way to realise revenues—through sales tax on petroleum products 
and rising utility prices—has equity implications; a higher sales tax rate on luxury 
items could be used to prevent, or at least reduce, the taxation of the essential and 
basic inputs to the production and distribution processes.  This would help increase 
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production, output, and hence employment.  High cost of production has been a 
major factor inhibiting investment, besides procedural and institutional delays.  This 
calls for a better coordination between the revenue department, investment ministry, 
and other relevant departments.  In this regard, serious note should be taken of the 
State Bank of Pakistan report which has not only revised the end-of-fiscal-year target 
of inflation due to the massive increase in oil price (which includes levy of customs, 
excise, and sales tax besides the petroleum development levy). It also points out that 
the decline in revenues of sales tax from kerosene oil, which is mainly used as fuel 
by the poor, is due to the decline in its sale.  The report maintains that these people 
are turning to woodlands for fuel.  This reflects the lack of communication between 
the Ministry of Environment and the tax authority.    
The revenue department, working in isolation, is focussing only on more 
revenue generation from the direct taxes by including withholding tax (WHT) in the 
income tax, and from indirect taxes by levying a uniform sales tax on all items 
regardless of the possible negative outcomes.  For an effective outcome of its reform 
package, it needs to consider the consequences of its policies for other departments, 
as well as the long-run consequences of short-term measures to achieve a rapid 
increases in direct and indirect taxes. This calls for a consultative process in policy 
formulation, which is generally lacking at all levels. 
 
APPENDIX I 
TESTS FOR STATIONARITY 
The first step in time-series analysis is the test for stationarity.  If a variable is 
stationary, i.e., it does not have a unit root, it is said to be I(0)—integrated of order 
zero.  If a variable is not stationary on level but stationary in its first-differenced 
form, it is said to be integrated of order one, or (1).  The presence of unit root in a 
univariate time-series is tested by the Augmented Dicky-Fuller regression (1979 and 
1981) of the form: 
∆Yt =a0+βt+γYt–1 + ΣPi=2  βi ∆Yt–i+1+ εt 
Where  
γ = –[1–Σ p i=1ai],   βi = Σj=i p aj 
∆ is first difference of Yt , a0 is the stochastic term that follows the classical 
assumptions—it has zero mean, constant variance, and is non-auto-correlated, or is 
white noise. 
The null hypothesis H0 : γ = 0 implies that the time-series is non-stationary; 
The alternative hypothesis, H0 : γ = 0, implies that the time-series is stationary. 
We estimate the equation by the OLS and compare the t-ratios of the 
estimated co-efficient of Yt–1 with the Dicky-Fuller table.  If the computed absolute 
value of tau statistics exceeds the DF critical tau (τ) values, we reject the hypothesis 
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that γ = 0, and in this case the time-series is stationary.  On the other hand, if the 
computed |τ|  is less than the critical |τ| values, we do not reject the null hypothesis.  
The results of the unit root test performed on each variable are reported in the 
following table.  
 
Appendix Table  
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Unit Roots 
   (Divisia Index Approach for Sample 1974-75–2002-03) 
Variables 
   Level 
ADF-stats 
Level 
ADF-stats 
First Difference 
ADF-stats 
Second Difference Result 
LADD –2.359382c,t –2.699034c*  I (1) 
LY –2.626483c,t –2.565092c –6.843948* I (2) 
LTDI –2.777864c,t –3.603557c*  I (1) 
LADIDT –2.743358c –3.588622c*  I (1) 
LTIDT –2.799894c,t –3.359485c*  I (1) 
LADC –3.551917c*   I (0) 
LCUS –5.723694c*   I (0) 
LET –3.330872c*   I (0) 
LADE –2.858721c –2.237782*  I (1) 
LS –4.496973c, t*   I (0) 
LADS –4.102213c,t*   I (0) 
Note:  *Denotes significance at 5 percent, “c” indicates that the constant term is significant; c, t, indicate 
that both the constant and the trend are significant; I (1), indicates the unit root in levels, and 
stationary after first differencing; I (0) denotes stationary at level; and I (2) denotes stationary after 
second differencing. 
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